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Andrew Aberdein
Abstract. A widely circulated list of spurious proof types may help
to clarify our understanding of informal mathematical reasoning. An
account in terms of argumentation schemes is proposed.
1 INTRODUCTION
A long-standing complaint of researchers into scientific practice is
that the published works of scientists do not reveal, indeed willfully
conceal, the cognitive processes that led to their results. R. K. Mer-
ton traces this complaint as far back as Francis Bacon [14, p. 4].
Researchers into mathematical practice must therefore have resort to
less obvious sources. One neglected but potentially revealing object
of inquiry is the folklore which circulates within the mathematical
community: slang, proverbs, legends, and jokes [17, p. 24]. As Freud
observed long ago, the last of these in particular can prove inadver-
tently revealing: a ‘suppressed purpose can, with the assistance of
the pleasure from the joke, gain sufficient strength to overcome the
inhibition, which would otherwise be stronger than it’ [6, p. 187].
Or, as the folklorist Gershon Legman puts it in the introduction to
his Rationale of the Dirty Joke: ‘What is suggested here is not that
all these stories are necessarily true . . . What is meant is that these
stories and individuals do personify . . . real but inexplicable pecu-
liarities of human behavior, which they are attempting somehow to
fit into a rational view of the world, whether as horror or as humor’
[12, p. 22].
This paper explores one notable source of mathematical horror
and/or humor: a collection of spurious proof types first compiled
by Dana Angluin as [3], and reprinted in full (with two additions,
but no attribution) in [17, pp. 28 f.]. The explicit and implicit ar-
guments they embody will be analyzed in terms of ‘argumentation
schemes’: stereotypical reasoning patterns, often accompanied by
‘critical questions’, which itemize possible lines of response. The
most thorough presentation of this methodology to date is that of
Douglas Walton and his collaborators [21]. Although argumenta-
tion schemes have been developed primarily for non-mathematical
contexts, many of them lend themselves readily to mathematical ap-
plication. For further discussion of this application, and some addi-
tional examples of argumentation schemes applied to mathematics,
see [1, 2, 4]. The classification of argumentation schemes is an open
problem, complicated, perhaps intractably, by the multiple dimen-
sions of similarity between schemes. Walton proposes a threefold
division between reasoning, source-based arguments, and the appli-
cation of rules [21, pp. 348 f.]. This order is broadly followed below,
but some of the categories are subdivided to highlight problematic
aspects of mathematical argumentation.
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2 RETRODUCTION
Much mathematical reasoning is sound deductive inference, secure
from the anxieties that jokes such as Angluin’s reflect. But not all
of it. One of the most ancient techniques of mathematical problem-
solving is retroduction, or working backwards. In one of its aspects,
at least, this was known to ancient mathematicians as analysis, a term
which has, of course, acquired other senses. Pappus defined it as
follows: ‘in analysis we assume that which is sought as if it were
(already) done, and we inquire what it is from which this results,
and again what is the antecedent cause of the latter, and so on, until
by so retracing our steps we come upon something already known,
or belonging to the class of first principles, and such a method we
call analysis as being solution backwards (’ )’ [8,
p. xlvii]. The steps which the analysis traces should be deductively
sound, and once the process is complete the order of the steps may
be reversed to yield a conventional deductive proof. This is familiar
in the strategy of reducing an open problem to one that has already
been solved. Of course, the target must be chosen carefully, as one of
Angluin’s spurious proofs indicates:
Proof by reduction to the wrong problem ‘To see that infinite-
dimensional coloured cycle stripping is decidable, we reduce it
to the halting problem.’ [3, p. 17]
Multi-step argumentation, often of substantial length or complexity,
is characteristic of, but not unique to mathematical reasoning. It may
be understood in terms of the following scheme:
2.1 Argument from Gradualism
Premise Proposition is true (acceptable to the respondent).
Premise There is an intervening sequence of propositions, , ,
. . . , , such that the following conditionals are true: If
then ; if then ; . . . ; if then ; if then .
Premise The conditional ‘If then ’ is not, by itself, acceptable
to the respondent, nor are shorter sequences from to (than the
one specified in the second premise) acceptable to the respondent.
Conclusion Therefore, the proposition is true (acceptable to the
respondent). [21, p. 339]
When a problem is to be reduced to a previously proved result, the
task of proving becomes that of finding a suitable theorem , and
the intervening sequence of propositions, , . . . , required for
this scheme.
Uncontentious deductive examples are not the only varieties of
backward reasoning to arise in mathematics:
Proof by importance A large body of useful consequences all fol-
low from the proposition in question. [3, p. 17]
This piece of reasoning is interestingly ambiguous. On the one hand,
it might be perceived as consequentialist practical reasoning:
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2.2 Argument from Positive Consequences
Premise If is brought about, then good consequences will plausi-
bly occur.
Conclusion Therefore, should be brought about.
Critical Questions:
1. How strong is the likelihood that the cited consequences will (may,
must) occur?
2. What evidence supports the claim that the cited consequences will
(may, must) occur, and is it sufficient to support the strength of the
claim adequately?
3. Are there other opposite consequences (bad as opposed to good,
for example) that should be taken into account? [21, pp. 332 f.]
Such reasoning is employed in defence of contested axioms or princi-
ples, such as the axiom of choice or the law of excluded middle, but
precisely because as axioms they defy proof. As a spurious proof,
‘proof by importance’ seems rather to work by suggesting that a
widely employed but unproven conjecture must be true, because of
its extensive coherence with other results. This sort of hunch was em-
ployed in defence of, for example, the Taniyama-Shimura hypothesis
prior to its confirmation by Andrew Wiles.
But reasoning backwards from the consequences of a conjecture
may also be understood as abductive reasoning. George Pólya dis-
cusses the importance of abduction for Euler in convincing himself
of the correctness of his novel proof that through
representation of sin as an infinite product: ‘Euler does not reex-
amine the grounds for his conjecture . . . he examines only its con-
sequences. He regards the verification of any such consequence as
an argument in favor of his conjecture . . . In scientific research as
in ordinary life, we believe, or ought to believe, a conjecture more or
less according as its observable consequences agree with the facts. In
short, Euler seems to think the same way as reasonable people, sci-
entists or non-scientists, usually think’ [16, vol. 1, p. 22]. Of course,
despite the importance of this informal procedure for Euler, he never
mistook it for proof. Indeed he kept worrying away at the problem
until he found an independent proof in more conventional terms.
Euler’s inference, and some cases of Angluin’s ‘proof by impor-
tance’, might thus be characterized by the positive form of the fol-
lowing abductive argumentation scheme:
2.3 Argument from Evidence to a Hypothesis
Premise If (a hypothesis) is true, then (a proposition reporting
an event) will be observed to be true.
Premise has been observed to be true [false], in a given instance.
Conclusion Therefore, is true [false].
Critical Questions:
1. Is it the case that if is true, then is true?
2. Has been observed to be true (false)?
3. Could there be some reason why is true, other than its being
because of being true? [21, pp. 331 f.]
The falsification variant is modus tollens, and thus uncontroversial.
From a strict falsificationist perspective, the best that can be said of
any hypothesis is that it has not (yet) been falsified. The defeasible
acceptance of a hypothesis on the grounds of non-falsification is an-
other application of the positive variant of this scheme. For empirical
science, this may come close enough to confirmation for practical
cases. In mathematics the effect is less convincing:
Proof by accumulated evidence Long and diligent search has not
revealed a counterexample. [3, p. 17]
Of course this is no sort of ‘proof’. If the scope of the search
is explicitly stated, a more limited result could be confirmed. But
counterexamples revealed only by extraordinarily long and diligent
searches are common enough to undercut any hope that such reason-
ing may hold in general. For example, Euler suggested in 1769 that
has no integer solutions, but it was not until 1986
that a counterexample in the millions was uncovered [20, p. 293]. It
is because of such counterexamples, which have few empirical ana-
logues, that the third critical question can only be fully answered in
mathematical cases by proving the hypothesis.
3 CITATION
Source-based arguments are a rich source of mathematical anxiety
and humour. The most numerous cases on Angluin’s list are those
which turn on deviant citation practices. As Paul Renteln and Alan
Dundes note, this prevalence ‘hints at the anxieties felt by many
mathematicians regarding the degree to which mathematical truth is
dependent upon the trustworthiness of previous results. This anxi-
ety is exacerbated by the fact that some mathematicians have a less
rigorous proof style than other mathematicians’ [17, p. 28]. Several
subvarieties may be discerned, many of them painfully familiar, in
which citation fails for distinct reasons. Firstly there can be refer-
ences to things which do not exist at all, or which do not say what
they are supposed to:
Proof by wishful citation The author cites the negation, converse,
or generalization of a theorem from the literature to support his
claim.
Proof by ghost reference Nothing even remotely resembling the
cited theorem appears in the reference given. [3, pp. 16 f.]
A more subtle issue is that the level of confidence which the source
ascribes to the claim may not be adequately reflected in the citation
of that claim. Angluin’s juxtaposition of the next pair of examples
nicely illustrates an anxiety about the credibility arbitrage which may
lie behind some references:
Proof by eminent authority ‘I saw Karp in the elevator and he said
it was probably NP-complete.’
Proof by personal communication ‘Eight-dimensional coloured
cycle stripping is NP-complete [Karp, personal communication].’
[3, p. 16]
In other cases, citations may send the diligent on a wild goose chase
which is practically (or even logically) impossible to complete:
Proof by reference to inaccessible literature The author cites a
simple corollary of a theorem to be found in a privately circulated
memoir of the Slovenian Philological Society, 1883.
Proof by mutual reference In reference A, Theorem 5 is said to
follow from Theorem 3 in reference B, which is shown to follow
from Corollary 6.2 in reference C, which is an easy consequence
of Theorem 5 in reference A. [3, p. 17]
Most transparently, the citation may refer to future activity:
Proof by forward reference Reference is usually to a forthcoming
paper by the author, which is often not as forthcoming as at first.
[3, p. 17]
Proof by deferral ‘We’ll prove this later in the course.’ [17, p. 28]
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All of these different cases may be understood as ineffective appli-
cations of the same argumentation scheme, that for Appeal to Expert
Opinion.
3.1 Appeal to Expert Opinion
Major Premise Source is an expert in subject domain contain-
ing proposition .
Minor Premise asserts that proposition is true (false).
Conclusion is true (false).
Critical Questions:
1. Expertise Question: How credible is as an expert source?
2. Field Question: Is an expert in the field that is in?
3. Opinion Question: What did assert that implies ?
4. Trustworthiness Question: Is personally reliable as a source?
5. Consistency Question: Is consistent with what other experts as-
sert?
6. Backup Evidence Question: Is ’s assertion based on evidence?
[21, p. 310]
Citation is indispensable in serious mathematical practice, but must
be conducted with care. Walton’s list of critical questions, although
designed primarily for a forensic context, provides a good starting
point for an analysis of what comprises such care. Good citation re-
quires a positive answer to all six questions. All of the above exam-
ples block a satisfactory answer to one or more of these questions.
For most of them, at least the Opinion Question could not be fully
answered. (Mutual reference may be an exception, but it certainly
fails the Backup Evidence Question, as do several of the others.)
All of these cases exhibit defective argumentation by the prover,
whose use of the scheme is exposed as unwarranted by his inability
to answer the critical questions. But the prover must also have a re-
spondent, the audience for his proof. Pseudo-proofs can arise from
the argumentational shortcomings of the respondent too:
Proof by vehement assertion It is useful to have some kind of au-
thority relation to the audience. [3, p. 17]
Here the prover leads his audience into employing the scheme for
Appeal to Expert Opinion, with him as the expert. In effect, he is
appealing to his own authority. Something similar may be happening
in the next case:
Proof by vigorous handwaving Works well in a classroom or sem-
inar setting. [3, p. 16]
In each of these cases the audience is browbeaten into acquiescence,
something they share with an even more common scenario:
Proof by intimidation ‘Trivial’ [3, p. 16]
In cases where the result is not trivial, and perhaps not correct, this
commonplace usage may be understood as a profoundly compressed
enthymematic instance of a different scheme, for Argument from
Danger.
3.2 Argument from Danger
Premise If you (the respondent) bring about , then will occur.
Premise is a danger to you.
Conclusion Therefore (on balance) you should not bring about .
[21, p. 334]
The argument induced by the dogmatic declaration ‘Trivial!’ may
be unpacked as an instance of this scheme: ‘If you ask for clarifica-
tion, you will appear to be a fool. Appearing a fool is a danger to
you. Therefore (on balance) you should not ask.’ (Those in no dan-
ger of appearing a fool can ask devastatingly simple questions which
might, from a humbler source, provoke mere condescension.) How-
ever, where the result seems trivial to the audience too, there can be
no intimidation in drawing attention to its triviality; rather, this may
be understood as a based on a different source: (shared) intuition.
4 INTUITION
Like citation, intuition is ubiquitous, but problematic. As Reuben
Hersh observes ‘If we look at mathematical practice, the intuitive is
everywhere. . . . The word intuition, as mathematicians use it, carries
a heavy load of mystery and ambiguity. Sometimes it’s a dangerous
illegitimate substitute for rigorous proof. Sometimes it’s a flash of
insight that tells the happy few what others learn with great effort’
[9, p. 61]. Unsurprisingly, this uneasy ambiguity manifests in jokes:
Proof by appeal to intuition Cloud-shaped drawings frequently
help here. [3, p. 17]
Proof by seduction ‘Convince yourself that this is true!’ [17, p. 28]
The second example may be found, almost verbatim, even in so au-
gust an author as G. H. Hardy: ‘The reader will convince himself of
the truth of the following assertion’ [7, p. 4].
Intuition can be private, but if it is intended to convince others it
must be shared; that is, it must be obvious. Hardy (crediting J. E. Lit-
tlewood) offers a partial resolution of the underlying ambiguity of
intuitive obviousness:2
When one says ‘such and such a theorem is almost obvi-
ous’ one may mean one or other of two things. One may mean
‘it is difficult to doubt the truth of the theorem,’ ‘the theorem is
such as common sense instinctively accepts,’ as it accepts, for
example, the truth of the propositions ‘ ’ or ‘the base
angles of an isosceles triangle are equal.’ That a theorem is ‘ob-
vious’ in this sense does not prove that it is true, since the most
confident of the intuitive judgments of common sense are often
found to be mistaken; and even if the theorem is true, the fact
that it is also ‘obvious’ is no reason for not also proving it, if a
proof can be found. The object of mathematics is to prove that
certain premises imply certain conclusions; and the fact that the
conclusions may be as ‘obvious’ as the premises never detracts
from the necessity, and often not even from the interest of the
proof.
But sometimes (as for example here [If and tend
to limits , , then tends to the limit .]) we
mean by ‘this is almost obvious’ something quite different from
this. We mean ‘a moment’s reflection should not only convince
the reader of the truth of what is stated, but should also suggest
to him the general lines of a rigorous proof.’ And often, when
a statement is ‘obvious’ in this sense, one may well omit the
proof, not because the proof is unnecessary, but because it is a
waste of time to state in detail what the reader can easily supply
for himself [7, p. 130].
Thus a claim of intuitive obviousness is a knowledge claim resting
on an equivocal basis. Both of the senses Hardy distinguishes may
be characterized by the same scheme:
Hersh also analyses the ambiguity of intuition, identifying six different
senses [9, pp. 61 f.]. Although Hersh ranges wider, Hardy is more incisive:
he subdivides the third of Hersh’s senses.
3
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mathematical Practice and Cognition , Alison Pease, Markus Guhe, and Alan Smaill  (Eds.), 
at the AISB 2010 convention, 29 March – 1 April 2010, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK
4.1 Argument from Position to Know
Major Premise Source is in position to know about things in a
certain subject domain containing proposition .
Minor Premise asserts that is true (false).
Conclusion is true (false).
Critical Questions:
1. Is in position to know whether is true (false)?
2. Is an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source?
3. Did assert that is true (false)? [21, p. 309]
In the second of Hardy’s senses, the prover and (so he assumes) the
respondent are in a position not only to know but to prove the ‘ob-
vious’ result, and the critical questions may be easily answered in
the affirmative. In the first sense, an adequate characterization of the
basis for the prover’s knowledge claim is more fugitive. It may be,
as Hersh suggests, ‘reliable mathematical belief without the slightest
dream of being formalized’ [9, p. 61]. Since he views this faculty as
reliable, Hersh would still answer the critical questions affirmatively.
Sceptics about such reliability would demur from one or both of the
first two questions.
5 META-ARGUMENT
A prominent feature of mathematics is the reification of arguments as
themselves the objects of mathematical inquiry. However, arguments
which bear upon the status of other arguments comprise a variety of
source-based argumentation which does occur in non-mathematical
contexts. Angluin’s list contains two cases which exploit this practice
in different ways.
Proof by metaproof A method is given to construct the desired
proof. The correctness of the method is proved by any of these
techniques. [3, p. 17]
Here the source from which the argument at issue arises is itself an
argument, the presumed virtues of which would indeed transfer to
the object argument, but of course, only if the method is secure.
Proof by funding How could three different government agencies
be wrong? [3, p. 16]
The existence of funding, like the eminence of the author’s institu-
tion, and other ‘esteem indicators’, might be taken as indirect evi-
dence for the soundness of his results. While this evidence is pretty
weak, similar evidence can be persuasive. One empirical study pre-
sented samples of undergraduates and research mathematicians with
a heuristic argument for the presence of one million consecutive sev-
ens in the decimal expansion of . Correctly attributing its author-
ship to Field’s Medallist Tim Gowers significantly increased the pos-
itive appraisal of the argument in both groups [10]. As one research
subject commented, ‘We are told the argument is made by a rep-
utable mathematician, so we implicitly assume that he would tell us
if he knew of any evidence or convincing arguments to the contrary’
[10, p. 42]. This demonstrates the perceived relevance of the author’s
ethos to the acceptance of his arguments, an application of the fol-
lowing scheme:
5.1 Ethotic Argument
Premise If is a person of good (bad) moral character, then what
says should be accepted as more plausible (rejected as less plausi-
ble).
Premise is a person of good (bad) moral character.
Conclusion Therefore, what says should be accepted as more
plausible (rejected as less plausible).
Critical Questions:
1. Is a person of good (bad) moral character?
2. Is character relevant in the dialogue?
3. Is the weight of presumption claimed strongly enough warranted
by the evidence given? [21, p. 336]
Walton’s version is not quite suitable for our purposes: the ethos of
must encompass epistemic instead of (or as well as) moral virtue
(as Walton explores elsewhere: cf. [21, p. 359]). It is not Tim Gow-
ers’s blameless personal life which leads us to trust his arguments,
but rather his demonstrably high standards as a working mathemati-
cian. Notoriously, academics can have deplorable ethical standards,
while still producing work of genuine value. This may be because,
unlike politicians, say, whose weak morals can prove more problem-
atic, they back up their claims with independently verifiable argu-
mentation. Does this obviate the need for consideration of their ethos,
even restricted to its epistemic aspects? Only if the argument is fully
worked out: if we are invited to accept aspects of the reasoning on
trust, it is not unreasonable to ask whether the reasoner is trustworthy.
Ethotic Argument is closely related to Appeal to Expert Opinion.
Indeed, the research subject’s comments quoted above could also be
construed as positive answers to some of the critical questions for the
latter scheme. As the commenter is inferring the absence of counter-
arguments from the absence of evidence for them, he might also be
taken as employing a different form of source-based argument, an
Argument from Ignorance.
6 EPISTEMIC CLOSURE
Arguments from Ignorance are typically classified as fallacious, but
they can be convincing in epistemically closed domains. Mathemat-
ics, however, is not such a domain, so legitimate mathematical appli-
cations of the following scheme are somewhat scarce.
6.1 Argument from Ignorance
Major Premise If were true, then would be known to be true.
Minor Premise It is not the case that is known to be true.
Conclusion Therefore is not true.
Critical Questions:
1. How far along has the search for evidence progressed?
2. Which side has the burden of proof in the dialogue as a whole? In
other words, what is the ultimate probandum and who is supposed
to prove it?
3. How strong does the proof need to be in order for this party to be
successful in fulfilling the burden? [21, p. 327]
This scheme is an instance of modus tollens, so its plausibility just
turns on the acceptability of its premises. The major premise states
the epistemic closure principle, which can be analyzed as a conjunc-
tion of two conditionals: (i) If were true, then would be known
to be true by someone; (ii) If were known to be true by someone,
then would be known to be true (by me). In much everyday, so-
cial knowledge this is unproblematic: (i) is trivially true and (ii) is
a straightforward claim about the speaker’s position within an epis-
temic community.
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In mathematical cases, (i) is characteristically false: there are few
unknown of which it can be said that if were true, then would
be known to be true by someone. A notable exception is the use of
computer assistance. If a computer is known to have calculated the
logical closure of a set of axioms, or determined which of a wide
range of cases have a particular property, then an unsuccessful search
through the resultant data set is conclusive: the truth of the closure
principle permits the deduction of the conclusion. Even when the clo-
sure principle is not known with certainty, it may often be practically
assumed. As the science writer George Szpiro remarks ofMathemat-
ica, ‘You can enter a function that you want to integrate, and out
comes the correct expression. And if it does not, you may be reason-
ably sure that a solution to your question simply does not exist’ [18,
p. 198].
However, (ii) is often plausible in mathematics. Experts may con-
fidently assert of many propositions in their field, that if a proof were
known, it would be known by them. Even non-experts can be con-
fident about some propositions: if a counter-example to Goldbach’s
conjecture is found, we’ll all know about it. So I may safely infer
from my ignorance that no such number has been found, but not of
course that it does not exist. Hence themodus tollens stops at (ii), and
the safe conclusion is not that is not true, but that nobody knows
whether is true.
Angluin offers an interesting variant of this argument:
Proof by cosmology The negation of the proposition is unimagin-
able or meaningless. Popular for proofs of the existence of God.
[3, p. 17]
This ‘proof’ employs a weaker closure principle: ‘If were true,
then would be imaginable.’ The absence of an objective measure
of imaginability makes this principle implausible.
Arguments from Ignorance can also be induced in the respondent:
Proof by cumbersome notation Best done with access to at least
four alphabets and special symbols.
Proof by exhaustion An issue or two of a journal devoted to your
proof is useful.
Proof by obfuscation A long plotless sequence of true and/or
meaningless syntactically related statements. [3, p. 16]
These three cases encourage the respondent to pass the buck, rather
than tackle a purported proof of conspicuous rebarbativeness. The
Argument from Ignorance would run ‘If there was something wrong
with this proof, someone else would have noticed. Nobody seems to
have noticed anything. So, it must be OK.’
7 GENERALIZATION
Much mathematical practice concerns the correct application of es-
tablished rules. A notable example is the move from particular to
general results. However, as with other mathematical activities, gen-
eralization lends itself to abuse when applied carelessly:
Proof by example The author gives only the case and sug-
gests that it contains most of the ideas of the general proof.
Proof by omission ‘The reader may easily supply the details.’
‘The other 253 cases are analogous.’
‘. . . ’ [3, p. 16]
These patterns of reasoning may be found in both historical and con-
temporary mathematics. John Wallis, for instance, routinely argued
from specific examples to the conclusion that a procedure may be
applied indefinitely. He ‘relied boldly and confidently on his really
astounding intuition as to the correlation between the sums of differ-
ent series. He called [this] “modus inductionis”: later it was termed
“incomplete induction.”’ [15, p. 38].
Standards of rigour have changed profoundly since Wallis’s day.
But instances of proofs by example or omission still arise in osten-
sibly rigorous contexts, although not always without reproach. Take
the dispute over Wu-Yi Hsiang’s alleged proof of Kepler’s conjec-
ture, that the maximum density of a packing of congruent spheres in
three dimensions is . In his review, Gábor Fejes Tóth com-
plains that ‘we are given arguments such as “the most critical case
is. . . ” followed by a statement that “the same method will imply the
general case.” The problem with arguments of this kind is not only
that they require the reader to redo some pages of calculations, but,
notoriously, that they occur at places where we expect difficulties and
most frequently it is impossible to see how the same method works
in the general case’ [5]. Both cases exemplify the following scheme.
7.1 Argument from Example
Premise In this particular case, the individual has property and
also property .
Conclusion Therefore, generally, if has property , then it also
has property .
Critical Questions:
1. Is the proposition claimed in the premise in fact true?
2. Does the example cited support the generalization it is supposed
to be an instance of?
3. Is the example typical of the kinds of cases the generalization cov-
ers?
4. How strong is the generalization?
5. Do special circumstances of the example impair its generalizabil-
ity? [21, p. 314]
This scheme underpins incomplete or enumerative induction. This
is, of course, formally invalid, but still has a place in informal math-
ematical reasoning, for example in hypothesis formation: is and
also ; I can’t think of anything which is and not ; Are all s ?
The concern with enumerative induction is that it may be mistaken
for proof. Some empirical research is worrisome: one study found
that 80% of trainee elementary mathematics teachers considered ar-
guments based on specific instances to be mathematical proofs [13].
But enumerative induction is not the only application of this
scheme. While Wallis might be described as employing induction,
Hsiang is attempting something else, but is still employing Argument
from Example. His generalizing moves are contentious because his
examples are said to provide insufficient support, and to be poorly
chosen, that is to fail the second and third critical questions, not be-
cause generalization is in principle non-rigorous. Where the exam-
ples are genuinely typical, and the method transparent, application of
this scheme is consistent with mathematical rigour. As Jamie Tappen-
den observes, ‘generalizing is much more than just picking constants
and replacing them with variables. Articulating the right structures,
which then can be generalized, is an incredibly involved process and
it is hard to get it right’ [19, pp. 264 f.].
A special case of generalization arises with diagrammatic proof.
Angluin’s list contains one example that articulates the conservative
attitude:
Proof by picture A more convincing form of proof by example.
Combines well with proof by omission. [3, p. 17]
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Defenders of the legitimacy of diagrammatic proof acknowledge the
centrality of the ‘Generalization Problem’: ‘After we have proved
a theorem using a diagram, how can we legitimately generalize the
configuration of this diagram to a wide (usually infinite) class of con-
figurations, and to what class exactly?’ [11, p. 81]. However, they
point out that similar issues arise in non-diagrammatic inference, and
may be resolved in a similar fashion in the diagrammatic case, by the
painstaking assurance that the particular case really does generalize,
that is by answering the critical questions of the scheme for Argu-
ment from Example.
8 DEFINITION
A less contentious application of a rule is the employment of a
definition. Well-chosen definitions can be pivotal to mathematical
progress. At a superficial level, this choice can appear arbitrary:
mathematicians have more flexibility in the concepts they take as
primitive than scientists in any other domain. On the other hand, ap-
peals to the naturalness or otherwise of definitions are frequent, and
a change of definitions can revolutionize the understanding of a hith-
erto intractable problem. Of course, this strategy can be abused.
Proof by semantic shift Some of the standard but inconvenient def-
initions are changed for the statement of the result. [3, p. 17]
Instead of defining the same problem with different terms, a different
(typically much easier) problem is described by the same terms. Such
sharp practice is a straightforward misapplication of the scheme for
Argument from Definition.
8.1 Argument from Definition to Verbal
Classification
Individual Premise fits definition .
Classification Premise For all , if has property , then can be
classified as having property .
Conclusion has property .
Critical Questions:
1. What evidence is there that is an adequate definition, in light of
other possible alternative definitions that might exclude ’s having
?
2. Is the verbal classification in the classification premise based
merely on a stipulative or biased definition that is subject to doubt?
[21, p. 319]
If the non-standard definition is poorly motivated, the example
will fail to answer the first question; if the non-standard definition
is smuggled past a classification premise only known to hold for the
standard definition, the example would (also) fail to answer the sec-
ond question.
9 CONCLUSION & FUTUREWORK
We have seen how the anxieties of practicing mathematicians, im-
plicit within their folk humour, draw attention to those aspects of
their informal practice where their argumentation carries the greatest
risk. We have also seen the utility of a diverse selection of argumen-
tation schemes, developed for non-mathematical applications, in the
analysis of a wide-ranging collection of spurious varieties of mathe-
matical proof. This may be read as further corroboration that ‘mathe-
matical reasoning is already in accord with principles and techniques
from informal logic—even if this is unnoticed by the practitioners’
[4, p. 150].
The argumentation scheme methodology has ancient roots, but is
still a work in progress. In recent years, it has attracted much atten-
tion from researchers in artificial intelligence. In particular, schemes
have been implemented within systems of defeasible argumentation,
and as strategies in dialogue games [21, pp. 370; 383]. The applica-
tion of schemes to mathematical argumentation is still in its infancy,
but the comparative maturity of the methodology in other domains
offers an inviting prospect for future research.
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